In order to understand how infants come to understand others' intentions we need first to study how intentional engagements occur in early development. Engaging with intentions requires that they are, first of all, potentially available to perception and, second, that they are meaningful to the perceiver. I argue that in typical development it is in the infant's responses to others' infant-directed intentional actions that others' intentions first become meaningful. And that it is through the meaningful joining of intentions that understanding (...) continues to develop. I use three common arenas in the first year to illustrate this claim: infants' anticipatory adjustments to being picked up, infants' emerging compliance to others' directives, and infant teasing. Even by the age of two months infants adjust their postures appropriately, gazing at the adult's face as they approach with arms outstretched to pick them up. From the middle of the first year infants come to recognize the meanings of verbal directives and start to comply with them, being drawn further into the cultural worlds of their families. In the last quarter of the first year infants start to playfully tease and foil others' intentions in a variety of ways, actively redirecting the course of intentional engagements. Others' intentions are thus increasingly available to infants, allowing cooperation, challenge, and further elaboration. Joint intentional actions are best understood as the processes through which intention awareness develops rather than just as the products of such awareness. (shrink)

Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of ‘three laws of qualia ’ based on a loose analogy with Newton’s three laws of classical mechanics. First, they are (...) irrevocable: I cannot simply decide to start seeing the sunset as green, or feel pain as if it were an itch; second, qualia do not always produce the same behaviour: given a set of qualia, we can choose from a potentially infinite set of possible behaviours to execute; and third, qualia endure in short-term memory, as opposed to non-conscious brain states involved in the on-line guidance of behaviour in real time. We suggest that qualia have evolved these and other attributes (e.g. they are ‘filled in’) because of their role in facilitating non-automatic, decision-based action. We also suggest that the apparent epistemic barrier to knowing what qualia another person is experiencing can be overcome simply by using a ‘bridge ’ of neurons; and we offer a hypothesis about the relation between qualia and one’s sense of self. (shrink)

The policy adopted by the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU on raising the quality of work and the effectiveness of social production means that work must be more highly organized and disciplined and that initiative and creative searching must be fostered. "The country sets as its goal enlargement of the real opportunities for citizens to apply their creative powers, abilities, and gifts and for comprehensive development of the individual.".

Religious experience differs from the empirical experience of the subject by psychologicality, the transcendental vitality of understanding objective phenomena. The main criterion of a person's religious experience is his belief in the truth of the existing a priori and the interrelations of things and phenomena of the objective and subjective world revealed to him in personal experience. Faith is a sense of the interconnection between the subject and the object, which has an experienced transcendental character. Human experience in this respect (...) acts as a factor in the disclosure of depth and effectiveness: a subject-object relationship accepted on faith: the disclosure of the meaning and directions of its development relative to the object of faith; as a set of acts of self-knowledge in the context of the existence of the object and, only thanks to the object of faith, brought into a whole, meaningful existence. Thus, the self-knowledge of a person depends, first of all, on the choice of an object of faith for him, as the meaning of his development. (shrink)

Money... What are they for a person? Man considers them his property, his wealth, something personal, belonging only to him, than he can dispose of at his discretion. Each person, by virtue of his character, treats money in different ways: the greedy they are hoarding, the stingy over them shake, wasteful is wasted not in measure.

Книга выходит к 150-летию со дня смерти первого русского культуролога А. С. Хомякова, актуализации наследия которого посвящены многолетние авторские исследования.

In our recent past, at first glance, an ideologically monolithic society was a kind of "collective soul" that envisioned the internal subordination of the individual to the social, collective, existing system of ideologies, stereotypes that were perfected and skillfully introduced into public consciousness - and suddenly this ideological one-dimensionality society collapses and the person is alone with one another.

Russkai︠a︡ t︠erkovʹ i drugie statʹi -- V temnykh religioznykh luchakh.

In this groundbreaking new volume, James Wertsch proposes a new formulation of sociocultural research that connects the various perspectives of the social sciences in an integrated, nonreductive fashion.

The article gives a short account of V.A. Smirnovs scientific biography, including his work in Tomsk University in Siberia and in the Department of Logic of the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow.

Ch. 1. Metodologicheskie problemy sot︠s︡ialʹno-gumanitarnogo poznanii︠a︡ -- ch. 2. Metodologicheskie problemy istorii filosofii i ėstetiki.